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THE MAINE INDIAN 
LAND CLAIM SETTLEMENT:
A PERSONAL RECOLLECTION
BY JOHN M.R. PATERSON
From 1971 to 1980, the state of Maine grappled with one of the greatest
legal challenges ever before it. That challenge had its origin in a suit
brought by the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes against the U.S.
Department of the Interior seeking the seemingly simple declaration that
the department owed a fiduciary duty to the tribes based on a federal
law adopted in 1790. That suit was eventually to lead to a suit by the
U.S. Department of Justice against the state of Maine, and potentially
350,000 residents in the eastern two-thirds of the state, seeking return of
land taken from the tribes in the latter part of the eighteenth century
and first part of the nineteenth century. The outcome was the passage of
two laws, one enacted by the state of Maine and one enacted by Con-
gress, the combined effect of which was to extinguish the claims, pay the
tribes $81.5 million, redefine the legal relationship between the tribes
and the state, and make available to the tribes for purchase 300,000
acres of land to reestablish a tribal land base. This article recounts the
author’s personal involvement in those remarkable events. The author is
a graduate of Bowdoin College and New York University Law School. He
served in the Office of the Maine Attorney General from 1969-1981, ini-
tially as Chief of the Environmental Protection Division and then as
Deputy Attorney General in Charge of Civil Litigation. From 1975-1980
he was the state’s lead attorney in charge of managing the state’s defense
of the Maine Indian land claim case. He was a member of the state’s ne-
gotiating team that ultimately produced the settlement. At present he is
an attorney with the firm of Bernstein Shur in Portland, Maine. His
practice focuses on civil litigation, with particular emphasis on media,
antitrust, securities, and complex corporate and commercial disputes.
IN THE early 1970s, with the help of the United States government,the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes brought suit against thestate of Maine. At issue was ownership of two-thirds of the land area
of Maine; the tribes argued that their lands in Maine were seized nearly
two hundred years prior by the state of Massachusetts, and later by the
state of Maine, without proper constitutional authority. After more than
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eight years of litigation, in April 1980, the Maine legislature enacted the
Maine Implementing Act as the first step in bringing to an end the land
claim issue in Maine.1 Shortly thereafter, in October 1980, President
Jimmy Carter signed into law the Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act
thereby taking the final step to resolve the lawsuits and the attendant dis-
ruptive public controversy and removing a potential cloud on land titles
in more than half of Maine.2 The combined effect of the two acts was
the extinguishment of the tribal land claims, the award of $81.5 million
to the two tribes to be used in part to purchase additional lands, and the
creation of a unique jurisdictional arrangement under which the state
would regain substantial legal authority over all tribal lands and mem-
bers that the state had lost as a result of a Maine Law Court decision in
1979.3 Subsequent litigation has tested both the fundamental premise of
the acts and has sought to apply the acts to a variety of circumstances.4
However, despite numerous lawsuits and attempts to erode the scope of
their application, the acts have withstood legal challenges and remain as
a unique framework for state-tribal legal relations. As a result, Maine
stands alone among the states in that it has substantial legal jurisdiction
over Indian tribal lands and members.5
As the thirtieth anniversary of the 1980 Maine Indian land claim
settlement has passed, memories have faded and some of the partici-
pants are no longer on the scene. Thus, this article was written to pre-
serve part of that history, and to reflect and comment upon a case with-
out parallel in the state’s legal history. The following is intended as a
brief history of the case covering the time period from 1971 to late 1980
from the perspective of one who was closely involved as an attorney for
the state of Maine at the time. It is based largely on the author’s personal
knowledge of events in which he participated as the state’s lead attorney
and from his personal management of all aspects of the state’s case from
January 1976 through the settlement in October 1980. Of necessity, this
article omits the countless details of each event, the detailed legal and
political strategizing, the countless conversations among the many play-
ers, and the many interesting and sometimes colorful anecdotes. Rather,
this article attempts merely to summarize the essential history of this en-
tire matter and the basic principles underlying the settlement.
The Legal and Factual Basis for the Land Claim
The Maine Indian land claim had its origin in a federal law, entitled
the Trade & Intercourse Act, more commonly referred to as the Nonin-
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With help from the federal government, the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy
tribes brought suit against the state of Maine in the 1970s. The two Maine tribes
laid claim to roughly two-thirds of the state's land, based upon a 1790 federal
law that prohibited treaties between states and tribes without federal consent.
Courtesy Maine Legislature and Law Library.
tercourse Act, which was passed by Congress in 1790. The Noninter-
course Act was one of the first pieces of legislation adopted by the First
Congress and was largely a continuation of a policy adopted by the
British in 1763 and subsequently enacted by the Continental Congress
under the Articles of Confederation. The act had a number of provisions
regulating relationships between Indians and non-Indians, some of
which have been changed from time to time since its original enactment.
In particular, the Nonintercourse Act prohibited any person from ac-
quiring land from an Indian, or a band or tribe of Indians, without the
approval of the federal government.6
The land claim issue in the 1970s arose because of four agreements
made between the Maine tribes and the states of Massachusetts and
Maine in the early national period. Although these agreements have
been commonly referred to as “treaties,” their form and content is sub-
stantially different from treaties between the United States and western
tribes entered into throughout the nineteenth century. Typical federal
treaties were executed for the purpose of ending hostilities between a
tribe and the U.S. government, and defined the terms of the tribal sur-
render. Such treaties also usually set aside a land reserve for the tribe. In
contrast, the Massachusetts and Maine “treaties” are in form more in the
nature of releases or deeds. None of the four treaties was generated as a
result of the cessation of any period of armed hostility between any of
the tribes and either state. Indeed the agreement of 1794 between Mass-
achusetts and the Passamaquoddy Tribe was executed in response to a
petition made on behalf of that tribe to the Massachusetts General
Court (the Legislature) in 1793 requesting that Massachusetts provide
that tribe with a land reserve in the District of Maine, then part of Mass-
achusetts.
The particular land transactions at issue were: (1) an agreement of
1794 between Massachusetts and the Passamaquoddy Tribe, (2) agree-
ments of 1796 and 1818 between Massachusetts and the Penobscot Tribe
and (3) an agreement of 1833 between Maine and the Penobscot Tribe.
It was the theory of the land claim lawsuits that each of those transac-
tions was illegal and void, since they had been consummated without
the approval of the federal government as required by the Noninter-
course Act. It was also the theory of the claim that equitable defenses
such as laches, estoppel, and adverse possession were not applicable,
since the claim had its origin in federal statutory law and not the com-
mon law of trespass.7
The geographic limits of the area claimed were never defined with
Maine History
precision, since the four agreements did not describe the lands with the
specificity of a traditional deed. However, it was the contention of the
Maine tribes that the combined effect of the agreements had resulted in
the unlawful tribal relinquishment of their right to aboriginal posses-
sion of the entire watersheds of the St. Croix and Penobscot rivers (ap-
proximately twelve million acres or two-thirds of Maine’s land area).
Under the principle of “aboriginal possession,” Indian tribes, lacking
deeds, royal grants, or other instruments of title under Anglo-American
law, are deemed to hold title to their lands by virtue of traditional usage
such as for hunting, gathering, and general seasonal movement.8 The
right of aboriginal possession is a right superior to all others except the
sovereign, which was either the English Crown or later the federal gov-
ernment. The sovereign alone has the right to extinguish aboriginal title.
It was against this basic principle that the First Congress enacted the
Nonintercourse Act, largely as a continuation of British Indian policy. To
this day, however, the exact scope of the Nonintercourse Act remains an
open question. Based on extensive historical research, the state con-
cluded that the Nonintercourse Act was never intended to govern tribal-
state dealings or to apply to land transactions within any state at the
time. Rather, and again based on historical research, the state concluded
that the Nonintercourse Act was only intended to govern land transac-
tions with tribes in what was then the western frontier, sometimes re-
ferred to at the time as “Indian Country,” and to grant the federal gov-
ernment the exclusive authority to deal with such tribes.9 The tribes, of
course, disagreed with that analysis.
In addition to the question of the meaning, intent, and scope of the
Nonintercourse Act, there remain unresolved historical questions re-
garding the events that gave rise to the four agreements. As stated above,
it was the tribes’ contention that the agreements constituted an affirma-
tive relinquishment of aboriginal possession to lands held by the tribes
at the date of each agreement. The state disagreed with that characteri-
zation of the events. Rather, it was the state’s position that, at least with
respect to the agreements of 1794 and 1796, they simply constituted a
reaffirmation by the tribes of the fact that they had previously lost their
aboriginal possession as a result of events (including hostilities) before
the time of the American Revolution and well prior to the enactment of
the Nonintercourse Act. The state concluded that the purpose of the
1794 and 1796 agreements was simply to put to rest any lingering doubt
on that point. It was the state’s contention that, in effect, the agreements
of 1794 and 1796 were nothing more than unilateral grants of land and
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ongoing support to the two tribes with corresponding releases by the
tribes acknowledging their prior loss of land.10
As a corollary to that issue, there was also the unresolved question of
exactly how much territory the tribes used and what they might legiti-
mately claim as aboriginal possession, as of 1790 when the Noninter-
course Act was adopted. That is, what was the scope of their aboriginal
territory as of the late-eighteenth century? Since all the New England
tribes, including the Penobscots and Paassamaquoddies, had been deci-
mated by European disease and nearly 200 years of conflict with the
colonists, the actual territorial scope of the lands used by the Maine
tribes in 1790 had undoubtedly been substantially diminished.
Although the tribes publicly insisted in the 1970s that their aborigi-
nal lands as of 1790 comprised all the Penobscot and St. Croix river wa-
tersheds, such a claim was not grounded in any kind of evidence nor-
mally relied on by courts.11 The anthropological evidence consisted of
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Democrat Kenneth Curtis served as Maine's governor in the late 1960s and early
1970s. In 1971, members of the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes met with
his staff to ask for concessions from the state. At that time, however, state offi-
cials did not appear to take the claims seriously. Maine Historical Society Col-
lections.
imprecise tribal tales nearly 200 years removed from modern-day
events. From that data alone the tribes asserted that a few hundred
members had, in 1790, used the estimated 12,000,000 acres in the area of
the two watersheds. Whether that was the case would never be known,
since there were no documentary records and in the end no trial to de-
termine the facts, since the entire claim was ultimately settled through
state and federal legislation. Even today it remains unclear as to exactly
how these events came to pass, why it was that Massachusetts and Maine
officials simply ignored the Nonintercourse Act, whether the act even
applied to these transactions, exactly what lands the tribes held at the
time they executed the various agreements and what they relinquished
in the agreements of 1794 and 1796.
The Passamaquoddy v. Morton Litigation
The origin of the land claim case itself is also something of a mys-
tery. The story circulated at the time was that sometime in the late 1960s
a tribal elder found a copy of one or more of the treaties in a trunk.12
She allegedly brought it to the attention of tribal leaders where it ulti-
mately found its way to a lawyer. Whether that story is true or apoc-
ryphal we do not know. Certainly the agreements had never been a se-
cret; they were included in an appendix to the government publication
of the laws of Maine in 1843. Furthermore, the agreements with the two
tribes are specifically referenced in the 1820 Articles of Separation be-
tween Maine and Massachusetts, and the Articles of Separation have
been regularly printed along with the Maine Constitution in the various
versions of the Maine Revised Statutes throughout the twentieth century.
In 1968 attorney Donald Gellers of Pine Tree Legal Assistance filed
suit on behalf of the Passamaquoddy Tribe in Suffolk County Superior
Court in Boston against the state of Massachusetts alleging that the state
had breached the terms of the 1794 treaty. Gellers sought the return to
the tribe of 6,000 acres and an award of $150,000,000. Within days of fil-
ing suit, Gellers left the state, however. There the matter seemed to die.
Then, in 1971, representatives of the Passamaquoddy Tribe met with
the office of Governor Kenneth Curtis and presented a series of de-
mands on behalf of the tribe, including a demand that the state pay to
the tribe the current value of the past due food stuffs and goods that
Massachusetts had agreed to annually provide to the tribes under the
1794 and 1796 agreements.13 Those demands were transmitted to Attor-
ney General James Erwin, where they eventually found their way to my
desk. Inquiries to various historians produced a rough estimate of the
Indian Land Claim Settlement 
cumulative total of what might have been owed.14 Those numbers were
provided to the governor’s office, but nothing apparently became of the
matter. From all appearances at the time, no one in state government
took any kind of tribal claim very seriously.
Shortly after Gellers’ departure, Tom Tureen became the tribes’ at-
torney. Tureen had prior experience working for the U.S. Bureau of In-
dian Affairs and had concentrated on Indian law issues while in law
school. He started his work in Maine as an attorney with Pine Tree Legal
Assistance, but by 1973 was working for the Native American Rights
Fund while assisting the Maine tribes. Tureen was well versed in Indian
law and recognized early on the potential for a claim against the state
and landowners based on the Nonintercourse Act. Understanding that
the tribes were barred by the Eleventh Amendment from suing the state
in federal court and were also barred by sovereign immunity from suing
the state in state court, Tureen devised a strategy to get the U.S. govern-
ment involved as a plaintiff on behalf of the tribes. In early 1972, the
Passamaquoddy Tribe wrote to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, within the
Department of the Interior, asking it to file suit against the state of
Maine under the Nonintercourse Act. At that time the statute of limita-
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Tom Tureen, an attorney for Pine Tree Legal Assistance who focused on Native
rights advocacy, represented the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes through-
out most of the land claim dispute. He is pictured here (second row, middle) in
1980, with Jim Sappier and Tim Love (second row) and Carl Nicholas, George
Stevens, and Albert Dana (first row). Maine Historical Society Collections and
Maine Today Media.
tions on all Indian claims was set to expire on July 18, 1972, since Con-
gress had previously established a general statute of limitations applica-
ble to all Nonintercourse Act claims, not just the Maine claims. And in
one of the most remarkable events of the entire dispute, Tureen per-
suaded Governor Kenneth Curtis, Senators Edmund Muskie and Mar-
garet Chase Smith, and Representatives Peter Kyros and William Hath-
away to join in his request to the Bureau of Indian Affairs that the
federal government sue the state of Maine. One can only assume that
none of them had any idea of the chain of events that would follow. In
any event, the Department of Justice (DOJ) responded on behalf of the
Department of the Interior stating that the U.S. government owed no fi-
duciary duty to the Passamaquoddy Tribe and, therefore, declined to file
suit on its behalf.
Upon receipt of the DOJ denial, the Passamaquoddy filed suit
against the Secretary of the Interior alleging that the government had
breached its fiduciary duty to the tribe under the terms of the Noninter-
course Act. Virtually simultaneous with that filing, the tribe requested
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Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, Maine's politicians played a decisive role
in the Indian land claim issue. Pictured here in 1984 are Edmund Muskie,
William Cohen, Margaret Chase Smith, George Mitchell, and Joseph Brennan.
Muskie and Smith both served in the U.S. Senate, while Cohen was elected to
the Senate in 1978 thanks, in part, to his stance on the land claim issue. Brennan
was state attorney general from 1975-1978 and served as governor from 1979-
1987. Courtesy of the Margaret Chase Smith Library.
and obtained a preliminary injunction requiring the Department of the
Interior to file a protective lawsuit on behalf of the tribe in order to toll,
that is to “stop the running of,” the statute of limitations.15 In response,
the U.S. district court ordered the Department of Justice to file a lawsuit,
and in July 1972 the Department of Justice simultaneously filed two vir-
tually identical protective lawsuits on behalf of the Passamaquoddy and
Penobscot tribes. This action alone was extraordinary, since federal
courts customarily decline to issue orders to the executive branch to file
lawsuits. Indeed, as far as can be determined, that may have been the
only time when a federal court had taken such an action. In its initial
status report to the U.S. district court in Maine, reporting on develop-
ments in the case, the Department of Justice described these suits as “po-
tentially the most complex litigation ever brought in the federal courts
with social and economic impacts without precedent and incredible po-
tential litigation costs to all parties.”16 Both lawsuits, each of which was
entitled United States of America v. State of Maine, were immediately
stayed pending the outcome of the Passamaquoddy’s suit against the
Secretary of the Interior. Ironically, Congress acted shortly thereafter to
extend the statute of limitations to 1977.
Although the Passamaquoddy suit was originally filed only against
the Secretary of the Interior, the state of Maine moved to intervene. In
retrospect, the decision to intervene came to be seen as a poor tactical
decision, since the resulting decision in favor of the tribe had a binding
impact on the state as an intervenor. That would not have been the case
had the state sat on the sidelines or participated only as an amicus, since
if the state had not been a participant in the lawsuit the decision would
have had less of a binding effect on it. That tactical decision was made
before I was involved in the lawsuit.
At the time few outside the Attorney General’s Office and the Office
of the Governor paid any attention to the Passamaquoddy lawsuit or
had any understanding of its possible implications. The existence of the
case was barely reported in the press. Early on in the case Attorney Gen-
eral Jon Lund requested a special appropriation from the legislature so
that his department could hire outside counsel and experts to help with
defense of the case. The legislature denied the request, since no one in
the legislature could be convinced that the case posed any risk to the
state.
In January 1975, the district court issued a decision finding that the
Passamaquoddy Tribe was a “tribe” within the plain meaning of the
Nonintercourse Act and holding that the U.S. government owed a fidu-
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ciary duty to the tribe to investigate the alleged breach of that law by
Maine and Massachusetts and, if warranted, bring suit to vindicate the
tribe’s rights.17 Both the Secretary of the Interior and the state appealed.
In a decision rendered in December 1975, the court of appeals affirmed
the district court decision.18 In rendering its decision, however, the court
of appeals was far more insightful than the district court in understand-
ing the possible ramifications of its decision on the potential underlying
land claim itself. Thus, the court of appeals said:
Before turning to the District Court’s ruling, we must acknowledge a
certain awkwardness in deciding whether the Act encompasses the
tribe without considering at the same time whether the Act encom-
passes the controverted land transactions with Maine. Whether the
tribe is a tribe within the Act would best be decided, under ordinary
circumstances, along with the tribe’s specific land claims, for the Act
only speaks of tribes in the context of their land dealings. If that ap-
proach were adopted here, however, the tribe would be deprived of a
decision in time to do any good on those matters cited by the Depart-
ment of Interior as reasons for withholding assistance in litigation
against Maine. And without United States participation, the tribe may
find it difficult or impossible ever to secure a judicial determination of
the claims. Given, in addition, the federal government’s protective role
under the Nonintercourse Act, ... below, it is appropriate that plaintiffs
and the federal government learn how they stand on these course mat-
ters before adjudication of the tribe’s dispute with Maine.
Yet the resulting bifurcation of decision necessarily restricts the
reach of the present rulings. In reviewing the district court’s decision
that the tribe is a tribe within the Nonintercourse Act, we are not to be
deemed as settling, by implication or otherwise, whether the Act af-
fords relief from, or even extends to, the tribe’s land transactions with
Maine. When and if the specific transactions are litigated, new facts
and legal and equitable considerations may well appear, and Maine
should be free in any such future litigation to defend broadly, even to
the extent of arguing positions and theories which overlap consider-
ably those treated here.19
At the conclusion of its decision the circuit court said: “we accordingly
affirm the District Court’s ruling that the United States never sufficiently
manifested withdrawal of its protection so as to sever any trust relation-
ship. In so ruling, we do not foreclose later consideration of whether
Congress or the tribe should be deemed in some manner to have acqui-
esced in, or Congress to have ratified, the tribe’s land transactions with
Maine.”20
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In light of that qualifying language, and concluding that an appeal
was not likely to result in a better opinion than that of the circuit court,
both the state and the DOJ decided not to file a petition for writ of cer-
tiorari in the Supreme Court.
The Events Following the Circuit Court Decision in Passamaquoddy v.
Morton
For a month or two after the Court of Appeals opinion, relatively lit-
tle attention was paid to it. It was reported in the papers without fanfare.
However, shortly after the decision, the Departments of the Interior and
Justice announced their intentions to pursue the claims against the state
as set forth in the original 1972 “protective lawsuits” filed by the DOJ on
behalf of the tribes. It was at that moment that I had the good fortune to
be named as lead counsel for the state. Although the suit only named the
state as a defendant, since virtually all of the claim area was in private
hands, the next logical extension of the suit would have been for the
DOJ to have commenced a defendant’s class action lawsuit naming as
defendants the roughly 350,000 residents within the claim area. Fortu-
nately, subsequent political events prevented that from happening.
Nevertheless, immediately after the court of appeals decision, the
existence of the suit exploded into public attention and, among other
things, derailed two state bond issues, which cast a cloud on land titles in
roughly two-thirds of the state and called into doubt the solvency of
banks holding mortgages on land in the claim area. In early 1976, both
the state and the Maine Municipal Bond Bank were scheduled to issue
bonds to raise, in total, approximately $25,000,000 for various public
projects. As a routine part of any bond issue, the bond underwriter must
provide an opinion of counsel. Among other things, the bond opinion
for a public entity must contain a statement affirming the legal ability of
the issuing authority to impose taxes to pay the bond purchasers. Al-
though styled as “opinions,” such statements of counsel are more akin to
a certification to the potential bond purchasers.
In early 1976, the state and the Bond Bank had engaged Ropes &
Gray, a law firm in Boston that had been long-standing bond counsel for
the state and the Bond Bank. When Ropes & Gray learned of the deci-
sion in Passamaquoddy v. Morton it undertook an inquiry to determine
the scope of the potential land claim area and the substance of the alle-
gations in the two still-pending protective lawsuits that had been filed by
the United States against Maine in 1972. Based on their inquiry and
reading of the Passamaquoddy v. Morton decision, Ropes & Gray advised
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the state and Bond Bank that they could not issue an opinion as to the
taxing authority of the state or municipalities within the boundary of
the land claims.
The attorneys at Ropes & Gray understood that (1) the factual and
legal allegations in United States of America v. State of Maine could apply
to any person or entity in the claim area, (2) the claim area encompassed
roughly the eastern two-thirds of the state, and (3) the U.S. Department
of Justice had expressed its view that there was merit to the suit and that
it intended to pursue it. Therefore, they reasoned, if the tribal claims
were valid, title to all land in the entire claim could eventually vest in the
tribes. Since under general principles of federal law Indian tribal lands
are exempt from state and local taxes, Ropes & Gray concluded that it
could not issue an “opinion” stating that the issuing towns could tax the
land in those towns in order to pay the bonds. Ropes & Gray also ad-
vised the state that, since the Department of Justice had stated its inten-
tion to actively pursue the suits, it could not discount the suits as frivo-
lous. As a result of their inquiry, Ropes & Gray also advised the state
treasurer and the Bond Bank that, although they did not have an opin-
ion as to the ultimate outcome of the claim, they could not determine
the claim to be frivolous and hence could not issue the needed bond
opinion.
The refusal of Ropes & Gray to issue a bond opinion in early 1976
resulted in the state government withdrawing from the market the pre-
viously announced bond issues. The turmoil in state government result-
ing from this event, plus the general publicity about the size and poten-
tial consequences of the claim, was enormous. For a period of time that
late winter or early spring, there were also rumors that the federal bank-
regulatory agencies might declare banks in the claim area to be insol-
vent, since so much of their assets consisted of mortgages on land in the
claim area, land which potentially belonged to the tribes. Although the
tribes stated publicly that they did not intend to dispossess any present
individual landowners, throughout much of 1976, land sales in eastern
Maine were substantially impaired, since Maine attorneys became reluc-
tant to issue title opinions to lending banks. This interference with nor-
mal lending caused some considerable public and business concern and
in some cases harm to those seeking to buy or sell property in northern
and eastern Maine. The press coverage and public debate over what to
do and how to “fix the problem” was seemingly never ending. To say that
the state of affairs in state government was close to crisis is to state mat-
ters too lightly.
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In response to this situation, and because no other litigation or po-
litical solution was then on the horizon, Governor James Longley called
on the Maine congressional delegation to solve the problem. Publicly he
insisted that the tribal claim should be simply extinguished by Congress
on the grounds that it was unfair to permit such a claim to be asserted
after the passage of almost 180 years. State Attorney General Joseph
Brennan supported Longley’s position. In response, in late 1976, the
Maine congressional delegation introduced legislation providing for the
unilateral termination of the tribal land claims.
The position of the tribes was masterfully managed by Tureen. He
presented a calm, determined, but reasonable image, expressing the
tribes’ desire not to harm innocent people in the claim area, but insisting
on fair compensation for the tribes.21 In response to the legislation pro-
viding for extinguishment of the claim, Tureen enlisted the assistance of
Harvard professor Archibald Cox, who publicly characterized the legis-
lation as unconstitutional.
Concurrently with developing a public response to the claim, the
Maine attorney general’s office undertook to develop a legal and factual
defense against the claim. That effort was lead by me, assisted by other at-
torneys and staff. In addition to legal research, we engaged several experts
to assist with the development of the historical facts necessary to defend
against the claim. The principal expert in that task was Professor Ronald
Banks of the Department of History at the University of Maine at Orono.
Banks conducted an astonishingly creative and comprehensive research
project to examine the origins of the Nonintercourse Act and its applica-
tion to eastern tribes in general, and the Maine tribes, in particular. His
work involved examining archival records in London, Washington, D.C.,
Philadelphia, Boston, and New York. His remarkable work was to form
the underpinnings of Maine’s arguments regarding the meaning of the
act. Tragically, he was murdered in 1978 while on a professional trip to
New Orleans, the victim of a senseless street crime in front of his hotel.
The initial state of chaos within state government, the state and mu-
nicipal bond markets, and in the real estate market lasted for about a
year. Fortunately, in March 1977, President Jimmy Carter, presumably
acting in response to behind-the-scenes discussions involving the Maine
congressional delegation and the White House staff, appointed Justice
William Gunter, a former Georgia Supreme Court justice, as a “special
representative” to inquire into and recommend a resolution of the land
claim dispute. The appointment of Gunter was sufficient to calm the
chaos with title attorneys, banks, and bank regulators, and shortly there-
after the real estate and bond sales market returned to normal.
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Justice Gunter met with the parties directly throughout the spring
and summer of 1977, and invited each side to make presentations as to
the claim on its merits. He also requested the parties to offer possible so-
lutions and consulted with the Departments of Justice and Interior and
the congressional delegation about ways to resolve the problem. As part
of the state’s presentation to him, the attorney general’s office submitted
lengthy memoranda addressing the merits of the claim and detailing
Maine’s historic economic support for the Maine tribes. The purpose of
the memoranda was to cast doubt on the merits of the claim and make
the case for a settlement fully funded by the federal government. With
regard to the issue of possible settlement, the memoranda argued that,
since for 200 years the federal government had ignored the Maine tribes,
neither recognizing them nor providing any programs to them, and
since, in contrast, the state of Maine had been solely responsible for the
supervision and economic support (albeit not generously) of the Maine
tribes, that, therefore, the federal government should assume responsi-
bility for compensating the tribes without cost to the state of Maine.
In August 1977, Judge Gunter publicly announced his recommenda-
tion for the general framework for a settlement. The essential elements
of his proposal provided that (1) Maine convey 100,000 acres of state-
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President Carter signed the Maine Indian Land Claim Settlement Act on Octo-
ber 10, 1980, with members of the state and tribal negotiating teams in atten-
dance. Here, Carter is pictured shaking hands with Tom Tureen, the tribes' at-
torney. Courtesy of the Jimmy Carter Library.
 
owned land to the federal government, to be held by the federal govern-
ment in trust as a land reserve for the tribes, (2) the state agree to indefi-
nitely continue its appropriation of $1.7 million per year for tribal edu-
cation and social welfare programs, (3) the federal government
appropriate $25 million, a portion of which would go directly to the
tribes and a portion to be used for support for federal Indian programs
that benefitted the tribes, and (4) the Maine tribal land claims be extin-
guished. Both the state and the tribes rejected the proposal.
There followed during the next two-year period a complex, behind-
the-scenes series of negotiations among senior members of the federal
administration, the Department of the Interior, members of Maine’s
congressional delegation, the state and the tribes seeking an economic
solution to the lawsuit. The state’s principal goal in these negotiations
was to force the federal government to assume the total cost of the settle-
ment. To that end, in 1978, Governor Longley retained well-known
Washington attorney Edward Bennett Williams to assist in lobbying the
White House. Over time, relations between Governor Longley and some
of the delegation became strained, largely because of Longley’s repeated
public demands that the delegation do whatever was necessary to extin-
guish the claim at no cost to the state, coupled with his public criticism
of the delegation for failing to solve the problem as he demanded.
Concurrently, both sides also engaged in a public relations battle,
with each side using every opportunity to attempt to sway public opin-
ion to its side. In general the tribes’ message to the public was: (1) the
claim had merit, (2) it was too risky for the state to litigate, (3) it was fair
for the state to contribute to a settlement, (4) the tribes did not want to
hurt individuals and businesses by taking land, but rather that they only
wanted fair monetary compensation, and (5) it was unjust, dishonor-
able, and unconstitutional for Congress to unilaterally extinguish the
claims without fair compensation.
In response, the state, principally the governor and attorney general,
publicly argued that: (1) the claim had no legal or factual merit, (2) it
was fundamentally unjust for the federal government to bring a lawsuit
almost 200 years after the events, and (3) if a settlement was to occur, it
was unjust for the federal government to require the state to make a con-
tribution, given that the federal government had provided no assistance
or programs at all to the tribes for 200 years. The federal government
had repeatedly denied any recognition of or responsibility for the Maine
tribes for 200 years and the entire burden of financial support for the
tribes had fallen on the state of Maine.22
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The public debate about the issue had become so polarizing that in
1978 it was a significant issue in the Senatorial campaign between Rep-
resentative William Cohen and incumbent Senator William Hathaway. It
was accepted wisdom at the time that Cohen’s outspoken opposition to
the claim was a significant factor in his defeat of Hathaway, who had
been active in seeking a settlement acceptable to both sides and whose
public statements about the claim had been moderate and balanced.23
In the meantime, the lawsuit in the U.S. district court remained
stayed. Although the court required periodic status reports and confer-
ences with the parties, neither party engaged in discovery and the court
took no action to treat the case as an actively-litigated matter.24 From
the outset the parties and the court had acknowledged that the case re-
quired a political settlement. Among other things, it was recognized that,
although the pending lawsuits were directed at the state of Maine, the
state owned a relatively small amount of land in the claim area (al-
though it did include Baxter State Park). It was understood by the par-
ties and the court that a suit directed at the full geographic claim area
would entail naming as defendants hundreds of thousands of landown-
ers in the claim area, probably in the form of a defendants’ class action.
It was also understood that the complexity of the factual and legal issues,
the problems of actual management of a case of that size, and the possi-
ble social and economic consequences, were such that as a practical mat-
ter the case would never actually be tried. However, in order to keep
pressure on the parties, the court scheduled regular status conferences in
which it threatened to move forward with the case if the parties failed to
find a political solution.
The Settlement Process
Following the rejection of Gunter’s proposal in August 1977, Presi-
dent Carter appointed a three person “Working Group” to attempt to
develop a workable settlement plan. Over the next two years, there fol-
lowed a series of proposals building on the conceptual framework first
laid out by Justice Gunter. Throughout 1978 and 1979, a series of pro-
posals by Senator Hathaway and the White House were put forward only
to be rejected by one or both of the parties. Nonetheless, despite the lack
of a specific settlement, by the fall of 1979 it had become apparent that
some form of agreement was likely. Intense pressure on the state con-
gressional delegation from the public and state political leaders caused
them to pressure the Carter administration to support ever more gener-
ous settlement packages which would exclude, most importantly to the
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state, a demand for state financial participation in any settlement. The
assessment of all parties was that the financial terms of a wholly feder-
ally-funded settlement were within political reach.
While all this was happening, two important legal decisions were
rendered. First, in July 1978, the Maine Law Court rendered a decision in
the case of State v. Dana and Sockabasin.25 The origin of the case was en-
tirely unrelated to the tribal land claim but was to have an enormous im-
pact. Unbeknownst to the Maine attorney general’s office, the Washing-
ton County District Attorney had commenced a criminal action in 1978
against two members of the Passamaquoddy Tribe, accusing them of
having committed arson against a tribal school on the reservation in In-
dian Township adjacent to Princeton, Maine. The defendants had
moved to dismiss the prosecution in the superior court on the grounds
that the state had no criminal jurisdiction over the reservation by virtue
of the federal Indian Major Crimes Act of 1885.26 That act provided that
the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over certain crimes,
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Members of both the state and tribal negotiating teams posed for this picture
outside the West Wing of the White House on October 10, 1980, immediately
after President Carter signed the Maine Indian Land Claim Settlement Act. The
author is standing in the third row, far left. Courtesy of the author.
including arson, committed “within the Indian country.” The Superior
Court denied the motion and the defendants were convicted. Unfortu-
nately for the state, the defendants appealed, arguing that the Pas-
samaquoddy Indian reservation was “Indian country” (even though the
Passamaquoddy reservation in Washington County was a state, not a
federal, reservation) and that, therefore, the state of Maine had no legal
jurisdiction over that reservation. What started out as a garden variety
arson prosecution ended up with a complex appeal involving issues that
were potential surrogates for some of the unresolved issues in Pas-
samaquoddy v. Morton and the entire land claim suit.27 The Maine attor-
ney general’s office took the case from the district attorney and briefed
the case on appeal. The Department of Justice also noticed the impor-
tance of the case and intervened on the side of the defendants. In its de-
cision the Law Court reversed the conviction and sent the matter back
for a rehearing on the jurisdictional issue. However, the Law Court’s
opinion made it relatively clear that the court believed that the state did
not have jurisdiction over crimes committed on the Passamaquoddy
reservation. Because of the potentially serious legal and political impact
of the case, a decision was made by the state to take the risk of filing a
petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. That petition was
denied in early 1980, leaving the state in the awkward situation of deal-
ing with a Law Court decision that potentially undercut the state’s de-
fense in the land claim case.
Although the Law Court’s decision in Dana avoided deciding that
issue, the state’s historical and legal analysis was to find support in 1979
in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Wilson v. Omaha.28 In that case
the Court said that the Nonintercourse Act only applied within “Indian
Country” which did not include land “within any state.”29 Needless to
say, the decision gave us increased confidence that our argument had
real substance. And we would later learn that the Wilson decision was a
source of great concern to the tribes’ lawyers.
But by then political events had accelerated and the legal implica-
tion of the decisions in Dana and Wilson began to be secondary to a po-
litical solution. By the fall of 1979, the broad financial terms of a work-
able settlement proposal, a proposal that required no money or land
from the state, were on the table and had been generally accepted by the
tribes. It was at that point that the state signaled its willingness to con-
sider settlement. However, the state had made it clear that it was not pre-
pared to sign any deal, even one entirely funded by the federal govern-
ment, unless the settlement included restoration of full state legal
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authority and jurisdiction over tribal lands and tribal members. Gover-
nor Joseph Brennan and Attorney General Richard Cohen publicly
stated that any federal/state/tribal agreement had to entail the restora-
tion of full state civil and criminal jurisdiction over all tribal lands and
members of both tribes. The White House responded by stating that it
would not move forward with any settlement legislation unless and until
the state and the tribes had reached complete agreement on all aspects of
the settlement and that the federal government would not impose a 
jurisdictional solution.
With an economic settlement in sight, the time seemed right for the
state and tribes to discuss these other essential issues. To that end, in the
fall of 1979, Attorney General Cohen made contact with the tribes’ at-
torney Tom Tureen for the purpose of exploring the possibility of a ne-
gotiated jurisdictional arrangement. Formal meetings started soon
thereafter. Cohen and I represented the state at each session. The tribes
were represented by attorneys Tom Tureen and Barry Margolin, along
with five members of each tribe.30 Also participating as an occasional
observer was attorney Don Perkins, representing many of the large land
owning interests at the time. Since the settlement had to include a mech-
anism for the tribes to acquire a land base which they would purchase
with settlement funds, it was necessary to include some representative of
the large landowners. Perkins was largely an observer and occasional
commentator on jurisdictional issues, and participated only to ensure
that arrangements for the purchase of land were made in conjunction
with the overall settlement.
In addition to the state/tribal negotiations, Perkins and the tribes
engaged in separate negotiations for the purpose of identifying and
agreeing on parcels of land to be sold to the tribes using settlement
monies. The tribes had made it clear that they would not finally agree to
any settlement unless they had in hand written options to purchase land
at agreed upon prices, lest they be left with money to buy land but no
willing sellers. Fortunately, a number of land owners appeared to be
ready to sell land to the tribes if the parcels to be purchased fit with the
landowners’ business plans. The state was not a participant in the nego-
tiations over the location, price, or other terms of those land acquisition
agreements.31
During the course of negotiations, it was my responsibility to pre-
pare regular memoranda to the attorney general and governor summa-
rizing each negotiating session, reviewing the parties’ respective de-
mands and proposed language, and analyzing the state’s negotiating
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strategy and possible language to resolve disputes and deadlocks. The at-
torney general and I regularly consulted with Governor Brennan to en-
sure that he was informed about and concurred with our negotiating
positions. Between negotiating sessions, draft language was exchanged
between the parties. In the end, I was the principal drafter of the final
language of what was later to be known as the State Implementing Act.
Without reciting the details of the negotiations, a couple of essential
observations must be made. First, at the beginning of the settlement dis-
cussions, the state expressly made it clear to the tribes that the jurisdic-
tional agreement had to be governed by one overriding principle: the
settlement would have to provide that the tribes, their members, and
their lands would be subject to all state statutory and common law and
the full civil and criminal jurisdiction of the state. The state was by that
time acutely aware of problems in some western states. There were nu-
merous conflicts between those states and their tribal residents, and we
made it clear that we would not agree to any settlement that replicated
those problems in Maine. By way of specific example, we made it clear
that we would not agree to an arrangement in which state environmen-
tal, hunting and fishing, gambling, tax, civil law (both statutory and
common law) and criminal laws, and the authority of Maine courts did
not apply to the tribes, their lands, or their members. While we indicated
our willingness to discuss specific exceptions, it was the state’s consistent
position that full application of state law to the tribes must be the over-
arching principle of the agreement. The tribal negotiators initially
protested, but within a matter of weeks agreed. From that point forward
there was never any misunderstanding between the state and tribal ne-
gotiators about this essential principle. For their part, the tribes made it
clear that it was of paramount importance to them to have control over
internal matters such as tribal governance, as well as over regulation of
hunting and fishing and land use. The state indicated its willingness to
discuss such matters. What was most remarkable was that after years of
acrimonious wrangling the tribal and state negotiators began to recog-
nize that it was possible to develop a legal template that honored the le-
gitimate concerns of both sides. Thereafter, the parties spent most of the
rest of the time negotiating the details.
Second, with the parties in general agreement that the tribes would
be subject to state law, the question remained as to exactly what kind of
entities they would be and what kind of powers and rights they would
have. Would they be traditional tribes, business corporations, some kind
of special statutory entities, or something else? More importantly, how
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would their powers be defined? As we discussed that issue, the state pro-
posed that the agreement specify that the tribes would be entitled to ex-
ercise the same kind of authority over their lands as municipalities do
within their municipal boundaries. As that idea evolved, it was agreed
that with certain exceptions set out in the final settlement, the general
powers of the tribe would be defined by reference to the powers pos-
sessed by municipalities. It was understood by the parties that the tribes
would not “be” municipalities. They would be tribes. But their powers,
and corresponding duties would be the same as those of municipalities,
including all the powers of home rule reserved to municipalities by state
law including the right to zone, to establish ordinances to the extent a
municipality could, to manage their own schools, to create industrial
and commercial parks, to build and maintain roads, and to operate their
own police and fire departments. In addition, it was agreed that the
tribes would be legally entitled to the same types of financial aid pro-
grams that went to any other town or city in the state.
In addition, the parties agreed that the tribes would be entitled to
govern their own internal affairs including determining who qualified as
members and what their form of government would be. The parties also
negotiated a complex mechanism for affording the tribes the right to
regulate hunting, fishing, and trapping on their own lands and bodies of
water, provided that the tribal regulation did not adversely affect neigh-
boring non-tribal lands. The agreement established a mechanism for the
resolution of disputes over those matters. The settlement also permitted
the tribes to create tribal courts with limited jurisdiction over certain
tribal crimes and civil disputes, including disputes arising under the fed-
eral Indian Child Custody Act.
In addition, the parties also agreed to the creation of a unique
mechanism which, it was hoped at the time, would provide an institu-
tionalized forum for ongoing discussion of the tribal-state relationship:
the Maine Indian Tribal-State Commission. Under the act, the commis-
sion had legal authority to enact hunting and fishing regulations on cer-
tain tribal lands and ponds that touched on non-tribal areas. It was also
anticipated that the commission might serve as an official body to ex-
plore possible future changes to the agreement. The commission had no
power to force future amendments, but could provide a setting for on-
going dialogue.
By early 1980, the state and tribal negotiators had reached agree-
ment on the exact language of what was to be enacted as the original
version of the Maine Implementing Act. The tribes and state had also
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reached agreement on the general framework for accompanying federal
legislation that was necessary to complete the settlement and ratify the
Implementing Act. In addition, and as reflected in the Implementing
Act, the tribes had reached written agreements with landowners, princi-
pally Dead River Company, under which the tribes would be entitled to
buy specific parcels of land using the eventual settlement proceeds.
Concurrent with these negotiations, the tribes had continued their
discussion with the Department of the Interior and the White House
over the economic elements of the settlement. By early spring 1980 an
agreement was reached on federal legislation that included the following
basic provisions: (1) the federal government would appropriate $81.5
million for the settlement, (2) of that amount, $54.5 million could be
used to buy up to 300,000 acres of land for the benefit of the tribes, (3)
the balance of $27 million would be held in trust by the Department of
the Interior for the use and benefit of the tribes, (4) the lands acquired
by the tribes would be protected against voluntary or involuntary alien-
ation, (5) the selling landowners would have their sales treated as if they
were forced sales (i.e., accomplished through eminent domain), thereby
avoiding capital gains taxes, (6) the federal enacting legislation would fi-
nally extinguish all Indian land claims in Maine, (7) the federal enacting
legislation would ratify any jurisdictional arrangement reached between
the state of Maine and the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes and
permit the tribes and state to amend that jurisdictional arrangement by
mutual agreement in the future and without the need to return to Con-
gress for approval, and (8) the Maine tribes would be officially recog-
nized by the federal government and afforded all the same federal eco-
nomic benefits as other federally-recognized tribes.
With a federal and state legislation agreed to, and with tribal and
landowner agreements in hand, the entire settlement was publicly an-
nounced in March 1980. However, because of the way the settlement was
structured, Maine insisted that it would not support any federal legisla-
tion until the jurisdictional agreement was formally adopted by the state
and the tribes. The state’s concern was that if Congress appropriated
money for the settlement and extinguished the claim before the jurisdic-
tional agreement was reached, the state would lose its leverage and the
tribes would have no reason to follow through on the agreed upon juris-
dictional elements of the deal. In addition, the state was concerned that
any jurisdictional agreement reached between the state and tribes would
be unenforceable unless authorized by Congress, since in matters of In-
dian affairs the federal government is paramount.32 Thus, the agreement
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was that the Maine legislature would act first, after which the federal leg-
islation would ratify and approve the Maine jurisdictional act.
As part of its consideration of the settlement, the Maine legislature
created a special Joint Select Committee on Indian Land Claims,
charged with the responsibility of conducting a public hearing and re-
porting to the legislature. On March 28, 1980, the committee held a
hearing at the Augusta Civic Center. Hundreds of people attended, in-
cluding the tribal and state negotiating teams. Copies of the entire text
of the settlement agreement were available for all to read. A transcript
was made of the committee hearing and published in the 1980 Maine
Legislative Record. During the hearing, Attorney General Cohen was
asked to explain the settlement and to state why he believed it should be
approved by the legislature. He stated, in part:
The proposal before you . . . recovers for the State much of the jurisdic-
tion over the existing reservations that it lost in current litigation - - in
recent litigation. It would be an overstatement to say that there would
be no difference between the Indians’ lands and non-Indians’ lands
under this proposal but I do firmly believe it is fair to say that by and
large this proposal is generally consistent with my belief that all people
in the State should be subject to the same laws. While there are some
exceptions which recognize historical Indian concerns, in all instances
the State’s essential interest is protected.33
Following Cohen’s remarks, attorney David Flanagan, counsel to
Governor Joseph Brennan, testified. Flanagan stated:
This proposal offers the potential for building a whole new relation-
ship with our Indian citizens. A relationship unlike that which exists in
any other state. By treating the Indian Territories as municipalities, this
Settlement provides that our Indian citizens will be on substantially
equal footing with their fellow citizens in other towns for the first time
in history.34
Flanagan then outlined the provisions in the settlement, noting that as a
general principle the tribes and their members would be subject to state
law and the jurisdiction of state courts, the sole exceptions being: (1) a
limitation on the exercise of state eminent domain on tribal lands, (2)
the creation of new tribal courts with limited jurisdiction over limited
offenses involving Indians and occurring on tribal lands and over Indian
family matters, and (3) limited tribal regulatory authority over hunting
and trapping on tribal lands and fishing on certain specified waters.
Flanagan then stated:
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With these exceptions all State laws will apply in full force and effect.
So it is accurate to state that there has been no compromise of the
State’s sovereignty at all. What we have created is certainly not a nation
within a nation but rather two new municipalities within the state.35
No members of the tribal negotiating team spoke in opposition to or
disagreement with either Cohen’s or Flanagan’s presentation.
Similarly the tribes were asked to explain why they supported the
settlement and, in particular, why they agreed to the jurisdictional
arrangement in the Implementing Act. Tom Tureen spoke for the tribes
and said:
One might ask why the Indians were willing to even discuss the ques-
tion of jurisdiction with the State but simply the answer is that [they]
were obliged to if they wanted to effectuate the settlement of the mon-
etary and land aspects of the claim which they had already worked out
with the Carter Administration....
The Tribes opened negotiations with the State concerning the
question of jurisdiction not because they wanted to do so but because
they were obliged to do so to obtain a Settlement that they had already
negotiated with the Federal Government....
As negotiations progressed, feelings of mistrust began to break-
down and a spirit of reconciliation made itself felt . . . both sides began
to attempt to understand and to the greatest extent possible, accom-
modate the needs of the other. For the State this meant among other
things, understanding the Tribes’ legitimate interest in managing their
internal affairs, in exercising tribal powers in certain areas of particular
cultural importance such as hunting and fishing, and securing basic
federal protection against future [loss] of land to be returned in the
settlement. For the Indians it meant, among other things, understand-
ing the legitimate interest of the State in having basic laws such as
those dealing with the environment apply uniformly throughout
Maine. Increasingly both sides found areas of mutual interest as, for
example, in the general body of Federal Indian regulatory law….[we
agreed upon] a blueprint for a governmental relationship unlike that
which exists anywhere else in the United States. The plan is very much
a compromise but both sides see it as a framework within which the
spirit of cooperation and mutual understanding which developed dur-
ing the negotiations can continue in the future. With this Plan it is my
clients’ belief that we in Maine will be able to avoid the bitterness and
rancor which all too often characterized Indian-non-Indian relations
in other parts of the Country.36
No member of the tribal negotiating team rose to disagree with Tureen.
In April 1980, the committee issued a written report setting forth
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the committee’s understandings of various provisions in the Imple-
menting Act, and the Maine legislature enacted the bill on April 2,
1980.37
Since the Maine Implementing Act expressly provided that it be-
came effective only on enactment by Congress of a law extinguishing the
claims, compensating the tribes, and ratifying the Implementing Act, at-
tention then turned to the appropriate congressional committees.38 Al-
though the tribes and state officials did not draft the federal legislation
or committee reports, every word of the federal act and the legislative
history was reviewed and, where necessary, renegotiated by the tribes
and state in order to arrive at language that was acceptable to all parties.
I personally spent days with Senate committee staff and Tureen negoti-
ating the language of the federal bill and the accompanying committee
reports.
Importantly, and consistent with the fundamental principle of the
negotiated settlement, the state insisted on the addition of a provision to
the federal law specifically reaffirming that, except for those specific sub-
ject areas set out in the negotiated state law as described above, the tribes
and all their lands were to be “subject to the civil and criminal jurisdic-
tion of the state, the laws of the state, and the civil and criminal jurisdic-
tion of the courts of the State, to the same extent as any other person.”39
The intent of the provision was to avoid the possible pre-emptive effect
of any federal legislation that delegated certain kinds of federal regula-
tory power to Indian tribes.40 Thus, the federal act provides that, except
as otherwise specifically provided in the Maine Implementing Act or the
federal settlement act:
no law or regulation of the United States (1) which accords or relates
to a special status or right of or to any Indian, Indian nation, tribe or
band of Indians, Indian lands, Indian reservation, Indian country, In-
dian territory or land held in trust for Indians, and also (2) which af-
fects or preempts the civil, criminal or regulatory jurisdiction of the
State of Maine, including, without limitation, laws of the State relating
to land use or environmental matters, shall apply within the State.41
The state also insisted on additional language to prevent future fed-
eral laws from undoing the agreement reached by Maine and the
tribes.42 The plain intent was to avoid future disputes in which the tribes
could claim inherent tribal sovereignty and exemption from state laws
by virtue of later enacted federal law.
In July 1980, the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs held
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two days of hearings on the federal Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act.
Representatives of the tribes and the state testified and indicated their
agreement with the settlement, including, in particular, the unique juris-
dictional arrangement. At this late point in the process, the Houlton
Band of Maliseet Indians approached the congressional committees and
insisted that they were entitled to participate in the settlement and in
particular were entitled to an award of some portion of the funds to be
appropriated. The Maliseets argued that, since the federal settlement act
proposed to extinguish claims of all Indian tribes in Maine, not just
those of the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot, they too were entitled to
compensation. The state opposed including the Maliseets in any sepa-
rate jurisdictional arrangement because it was too late in the process,
but more importantly because the Maliseets were believed to have no
colorable claim under the Nonintercourse Act. The federal administra-
tion also opposed increasing the appropriation to make any payment to
the Maliseets. In order to facilitate a resolution of this last-minute dis-
pute, the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes agreed that $900,000 of
the land acquisition fund could be used to acquire land for the Maliseet
Band. However, no provision was added to provide any degree of sepa-
rate legal authority to Maliseets, and they remained subject to all laws of
the state, without the same exceptions as agreed to with respect to the
Penobscots and Passamaquoddies.
In September 1980, the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs and the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs issued their
respective reports.43 Thereafter the Maine Indian Land Claims Settle-
ment Act was enacted by Congress in September and signed by President
Carter at the White House on October 10, 1980, in a ceremony attended
by tribal and state leaders, including me.44
The end result of the years of sometimes bitter political and public
relations wrangling, legal strategizing, and complex negotiations was the
creation of a jurisdictional and legal relationship between the state of
Maine and the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy tribes unlike that in any
other state. At the time of its completion, most of the participants and
observers were optimistic that the settlement augured a new future of
cooperation between the state and tribes as predicted by Attorney Gen-
eral Cohen. The prior eight years had been marked by public acrimony
and ill-will, and it was hoped that the settlement would mark a new
start. Many were also hopeful that the tribal trust funds would enable
the tribes to develop a more prosperous tribal economy, which would
help them address some of the difficulties experienced by their mem-
Indian Land Claim Settlement 
bers. Regrettably the settlement has not resulted in the kind of harmo-
nious relationship between the state and the tribes that the drafters con-
templated. Nor has it resulted in the kind of economic improvement for
the tribes that was hoped for. One can hope that both of those problems
will improve in the years to come.
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